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Abstract. Estimating the value of top managerial talent is a central topic of research that has 
attracted widespread attention from academics and practitioners. Yet, studying the impact of 
managers on firm performance is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variables concerns. 
In this paper, we test for the impact of managers on firm performance in two ways. First, we 
examine whether top executive deaths have an impact on firm performance, focusing on the 
manager and firm characteristics that are associated to large manager-death effects. Second, we test 
for the interaction between the personal and professional activities of managers by examining the 
effect of deaths of immediate family members (spouses, parents, children, etc) on firm performance. 
Our main findings are three. First, CEO deaths are strongly correlated with declines in firms 
operating profitability, asset growth and sales growth. Second, the death of board members does not 
seem to affect firm prospects, indicating that not all senior managers are equally important for firms’ 
outcomes. Third, CEOs’ immediate family deaths are significantly negatively correlated to firm 
performance. This last result suggests a strong link between the personal and business roles that top 
management plays, a connection that is present even in large firms. Overall, our findings 
demonstrate CEOs are extremely important for firms’ prospects. 
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What do managers do? Do managers meaningfully affect firm decision’ making 
and performance? What types of managers (decisions) do matter? What types of shocks 
affect managers’ productive abilities? Estimating the source and value of top managerial 
talent is a central topic of research in corporate governance. Yet empirical studies testing 
for the value of managers on performance have typically faced the challenge of finding a 
suitable counterfactual to convincingly assess the contribution of managers in their 
organizations. This challenge arises from the fact that firms do not randomly appoint nor 
fire managers. Thus it is hard to evaluate firms’ performance in the absence of the 
current, presumably efficient, managers.  
Empirical studies typically infer the value of managers on their firms from either 
purely cross-sectional settings or from manager turnover events. The former type of 
studies commonly face the challenge of distinguishing managerial effects from other firm 
attributes, as it is hard to find suitable controls for all relevant firm and managerial 
characteristics. The latter empirical strategies, in contrast, tend to be better at 
distinguishing managerial from firm-invariant characteristics as they commonly infer 
managerial value from differences in firm performance around turnover events. Yet, 
executive turnovers tend to occur only under dramatic circumstances resulting from both 
managers’ actions (discretion) and changing firm characteristics, which are difficult to 
disentangle. 
In this paper we seek to overcome some of the shortcomings of pre-existing work 
in the literature by evaluating the impact of managers on performance using variation 
from managers’ own deaths and other personal shocks. Specifically we test whether the 
death of the manager or the death of a family member (spouse, parents, children, etc) 
affects firm performance. The advantages of this horrid empirical strategy are two. First, 
we can identify a shock that presumably affects managers’ ability to perform their jobs: 
directly through their own death or indirectly as a result of personal grief, which might 
affect the effectiveness of managers to execute their professional roles. Second, it is 
reasonable to expect that beyond its effect on managers, personal shocks, particularly 
those associated to family members that are unaffiliated to the managers’ firm, do not 
affect firms’ investment opportunities through other channels.
  
  1Our analysis on the death of top executive officers resembles the empirical 
strategy of Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985), who assessed the impact of 
sudden deaths of senior corporate executives on the stock prices of 53 U.S. publicly-
traded firms. We extend the analysis to the performance evaluation of a larger number 
and wider range of firms. Further, we also assess the impact of a richer array of executive 
and firm characteristics that could affect the impact of managers on firm performance.  
More interestingly, our focus on the shocks occurring to the immediate family 
members of managers, and our assessment of their potential consequences on firms’ 
outcomes provides a new test for the interaction between the personal and the business 
roles that managers play. This latter test allows us to (1) investigate the level of overlap 
between these two spheres under management influence, and (2) identify the differential 
impact of alternative shocks occurring to business executives.  
To pursue these questions empirically, we use a unique dataset that matches (1) 
every limited liability firm in Denmark to its chief executive officer (CEO) and to its 
members of the board of directors, and (2) every executive and director in the sample to 
Civil Registry data containing information on the managers’ family tree. Using Civil 
Registry information we are able to identify CEO deaths, as well as, deaths occurring in 
the managers’ immediate families. We then use the National Hospital Records of 
Denmark to identify the causes of each death.  
We identify 11,002 deaths occurring to executives and board members, and their 
immediate family members between 1994 and 2002. In the sample, 1,476 deaths 
corresponded to CEOs (629 cases) and board members (847), 1,483 to spouses, 415 to 
children, 5,046 to parents, and 2,561 to parents-in-law, respectively.  
We begin our analysis by testing for direct senior management (CEO and board 
members) effects. We find evidence that the death of top managers is likely to cause a 
statistically significantly and economically large decline in firm profitability. Operating 
returns on assets (OROA) falls by 0.6 percentage points using a two-year window around 
managerial deaths. This decline is equivalent to a 9.6 percent decline in profitability. 
Interestingly, the significant effect in performance is only explained by the deaths of 
CEOs, which are associated with a decline in OROA of 1.4 percentage points or 18 
percent, significant at the one-percent level. The effect of board members in performance 
  2is negative but insignificant at conventional levels. These results indicate that the loss of 
the current CEOs, but not of a board member, is important for firm’s prospects. 
We then assess the impact of family shocks on firm performance. We find that 
deaths of immediate family members of managers also cause significant declines in 
performance. OROA falls by 0.8 percent, 0.7 percent, 0.6 percent, and 0.4 percent when 
the deceased is a spouse, a child, a parent, and a parent in law, respectively. The declines 
associated with deaths of a spouse and of a parent are statistically significant at the one 
percent level. Paralleling the results obtained with own death shocks, we find that family 
members’ deaths are associated with statistically significant declines in performance only 
when these shocks occur to CEOs (results are statistically significant at conventional 
levels for all types of family members), but not when they occur to board members. 
Given that our dataset is representative of the universe of limited liability firms in 
Denmark, one concern with the above-described results is that they might only be 
relevant for small firms, which tend to be more dependant on their CEOs and where the 
level of overlap between personal and business affairs is likely to be larger. We find, 
however, that this is not the case. Both small and large firms’ operating profitability is 
significantly hurt by shocks affecting their CEOs. 
We test further whether our family death shocks are likely to reflect “direct” or 
“indirect” shocks. One concern with the family shock results is that the deaths of family 
members might affect firm performance directly because the deceased relative was a key 
firm employee. Our results, however, indicate that this is not the case. Deaths of family 
members that are not of working age (younger than 18) have a large and significant 
negative effect on firm profitability that is statistically indistinguishable from the declines 
in performance that result from the deaths of other family members. This finding 
highlights that the family-death results are driven by an indirect shock that works through 
the firms’ CEO.  
We provide suggestive evidence that the decline in performance around direct and 
indirect shocks is related to managerial ability. Specifically, we find that the decline in 
performance following a shock to a CEO is larger in industries in which managerial talent 
is presumably more important, such as, fast growing industries, as well as, in 
environments with highly educated labor force. 
  3Overall, manager-death shocks provide direct evidence that CEOs (but not board 
members) are extremely important for firm performance. Family-death results 
demonstrate there is a strong overlap between the personal lives and the professional 
roles that CEOs play, and they provide further evidence that current CEOs are extremely 
important for firms’ prospects.  
While we cannot provide a direct test for whether our results reveal that CEOs 
add economic value in an ex-ante sense, we do show that the CEOs’ permanent or 
temporary absence is material for firm performance, ex-post.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews previous work in 
the literature that is closely related to our own analysis. Section II describes the data and 
presents summary statistics. Section III outlines our empirical strategy; Section IV 
presents the results of the paper; and Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Related Literature [incomplete] 
 
Our work is related to several lines of research as detailed below. 
First, there is a large literature that also studies managerial departures but as a 
result of forced resignations and retirements rather than death. Denis and Denis (1995) 
evaluate changes in operating return on assets around such events in a sample of 908 U.S. 
publicly traded firms and find significant performance improvements after the event, 
especially for forced resignations. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) also find 
improvements in accounting profitability after CEO turnover events. Moreover, they find 
that the stock price reaction to the turnover event is positively correlated with the 
subsequent improvement in accounting measures.  
In this paper we focus instead on managerial departures that are due to death. 
Resignations and retirements can be prompted by changes in unobserved firm 
characteristics, making it challenging to disentangle the effect of the loss of the current 
manager from the change in firm circumstances. The advantage of focusing on death 
related departures is that the timing of death is exogenous to changes in unobservable 
characteristics of the firm. As a result the measured change in firm performance can be 
attributed to the loss of the deceased manager.  
  4Our empirical strategy is closely related to that of Johnson et al. (1985) who asses 
the stock price reaction of sudden executives deaths on 53 U.S. publicly-traded firms. We 
extend the analysis to the performance evaluation of a larger number and wider range of 
firms. Further, we also assess the impact of a richer array of executive and firm 
characteristics that could affect the impact of managers on firm performance. 
  Second, our results on the relation between the personal life and the professional 
role that managers play are related to a growing literature on manager characteristics and 
firm decision-making. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that variation in firm policies 
can be attributed to manager fixed effects suggesting a role for managerial preferences, 
opinion, experience, etc. in firm decision-making. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) studies the 
performance consequences of nominating either a family CEO or a one that is unrelated 
to the departing executive. He finds that the level of education of a family CEO is 
associated with performance, with more educated family CEOs performing better. 
Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007) study the effect of family 
characteristics on the decision to name a family or an unrelated successor and ultimately 
on performance. They show that family characteristics have a strong impact on this 
decision. For example, they find that CEOs whose firstborn are males are more likely to 
pass on control to a family member than those with female firstborns. They also show 
that other family characteristics, such as number of children, CEO marital status, etc., are 
associated with the succession decision.  
 
II.  Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
II.A. Data Sources 
We construct a dataset starting from the universe of limited liability (publicly and 
privately held) firms in Denmark (74,880 firms) and identify 11,002 firms in which the 
CEO, a board member, or any of these managers’ immediate relatives die between 1994 
and 2002. Our dataset contains financial information on firms, as well as personal and 
family information about CEOs and board members. The dataset was constructed based 
on four different sources, as explained below. 
  51. Financial and management information are from Købmandsstandens 
Oplysningsbureau (KOB). KOB is a dataset assembled by a private firm using the annual 
reports that all limited liability firms are required to file at the Danish Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs. The dataset contains selected accounting and 
management information on the universe of limited liability companies in Denmark. 
Local regulations only mandate disclosure of firms’ assets and measures of firm 
profitability, such as operating or net income. The disclosure of alternative firm-level 
attributes, such as sales or employment, is not required, although some firms do 
selectively report them. Management data, which all firms are required to report, include 
the names and position of executives and board members. 
We obtained access to management information from 1994 to 2002, and financial 
data from 1991 to 2003. Even though a large fraction of KOB firms are privately held, 
KOB data are likely to be reliable, as Danish corporate law requires annual reports to be 
approved by external accountants. Given our focus on changes in firm performance 
around CEO transitions, for our analysis, we only require that reporting biases are 
consistent at the firm level. 
2. Individual and family data about CEOs and board members are from the 
official Danish Civil Registration System. These administrative records include the 
personal identification number (CPR), name, gender, and dates of birth and death of all 
Danish citizens. In addition, these records contain the names and CPR numbers of 
parents, siblings, and children, as well as the individual’s marital history (number of 
marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). We use these data to construct CEOs and board 
members’ family trees and to identify deaths in their families. 
3. To match the names of top management reported in KOB with their CPR 
numbers, which are needed to access their individual and family information in the 
Danish Civil Registration System, we use a database from the Danish Commerce and 
Companies Agency (Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, or ES), at the Ministry of Economic 
and Business Affairs. The ES dataset reports both the names and CPR numbers of 
management and board members of all limited liability corporations. Under Danish 
corporate law, firms are required to file with ES any change in CEO or board positions 
within two weeks of the actual date of occurrence. 
  6Firm by firm, we match the name of the CEO reported in KOB with the name 
reported in the ES dataset. For all these matches, we use the CPR number from ES to 
obtain family information from the official Danish Civil Registration System. Despite the 
fact that women often drop their maiden names after marriage, we are able to match men 
and women equally well. We do it by using women’s family trees to reconstruct their 
maiden names, as well as other names they had in previous marriages.  
4. Finally, we use the National Hospital Records of Denmark to obtain 
information about the causes of death as well as the number of days the deceased stayed 
at the hospital prior to dying.   
In the paper, we classify a firm as an event firm when three conditions are met. 
First, the records in the CRP agency indicate that the CEO (board members) or any of his 
(their) immediate relatives die during the managers’ tenure. Second, we require that 
matching financial information from KOB is available around CEO transitions and that 
firm employment, where available, was not zero. Third, in case of multiple shocks to a 
single firm, we retain only the first one. 
 
II.B. Firm Characteristics 
Table I presents summary statistics of the firms in the sample both as a group 
(Column I) and classified by their event status. Information for non-event firms is listed 
in Column II and that for event firms is in Column III.  
Table I shows that event firms are larger than non-event firms. The first row in 
Table I shows the natural logarithm of total assets for the firms in the sample. Event firms 
are relatively larger. On average, event-firms had 2000 Danish Kroner (DKR) 67.2 
million or US$8.3 million in assets. In contrast, non-event firms had, on average, DKR 
27.2 million or US$3.4 million in assets.
1 The difference in firm size is significant at the 
one-percent level.  As an alternative measure of size, we report the natural logarithm of 
                                                 
 
1 The average exchange rate in 2000 was equivalent to 8.08 Kroner per U.S. dollar (World 
Development Indicators). 
 
  7sales in the fourth row. The figure for event firms is larger than that for non-event firms 
and the difference is significant at the one-percent level.  
Table I also shows that event firms are older. On average, firm age is almost 17 
years for event firms, while it is only 10 years for non-event firms. Again, this difference 
is statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
There are two reasons why event firms are larger and older. First, larger and older 
firms are more likely to have a board of directors and, conditional on having one, they are 
more likely to have larger boards. These firms are more likely to have a shock because 
the pool of potential candidates who can die is larger. Second, in the data there is a 
positive correlation between firm age and the age of its managers. Older manager are 
more likely to have larger families and also more likely to have older family members, 
increasing the probability of having a death in the family. 
Given that regulations only mandate disclosure of firms’ assets and measures of 
profitability such as operating and net income, in Table I we scale operating and net 
income using the book value of assets in order to present comparable measures of firm 
performance. Operating return on assets (OROA) is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the book value of assets. OROA is a natural measure 
of performance that has been previously used in the CEO turnover literature to assess if 
firms operations change around successions [Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, Malatesta, 
and Parrino, 2004; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen Nielsen, Pérez-González, and 
Wolfenzon, 2007]. It compares a comprehensive proxy of firms’ cash flows (EBIT) to the 
total asset base used to generate them. Unlike net income-based measures, such as return 
on assets, it is unaffected by differences in the firms’ capital structure decisions. In 
contrast to return on equity or return on capital employed, it compares firm performance 
relative to total assets, rather than to a fraction of them. Average OROA is 6.0 percent for 
all firms in the sample.  
Splitting firms by event status, we find that event firms are, on average, more 
profitable than non-event firms: 7.7 and 5.7 percent, respectively; the difference of 2.0 
percentage points is significant at the one-percent level. 
In Table I we also present the ratio of net income to assets, calculated using after-
tax profits relative to the book value of assets. The average net income to assets is 3.4 
  8percent and, as before, event firms are more profitable than non-event firms. The 
difference is 0.9 percent, significant at the one-percent level.  
Table I also reports industry-adjusted measures of OROA. Industry controls are 
calculated using equally weighted averages of all active firms. For each industry, we 
require that at least 20 non-event firms exist in any given year. We favor four-digit 
industry (NACE, European industry classification system) controls, and move to two-
digits if the 20-firm restriction is not satisfied with four- or three-digit groupings. 
Industry-adjusted OROA shows that the difference in profitability for event and non-
event firms is not entirely driven by industry characteristics: the difference is 1.1 
percentage points. The reason why event firms are more profitable could be that better 
firms survive longer. This longevity implies that managers in these firms are older and 
hence, as explained before, more likely to suffer a death in the family of the CEO or one 
of its board members. 
Finally, Table I shows that event firms have higher asset and sales growth. For 
both these measures the differences between event and non-event firms are significant at 
the one-percent level. 
In sum, Table I shows that event firms are older, larger and more profitable than 
non-event firms. 
  
II.C. Event characteristics 
We classify shocks by the type of manager affected: CEOs (5,597 shocks) and 
board members (5,405 shocks). Given that boards of directors typically have many 
members, it might appear that the number of shocks to board members is too low relative 
to that for CEOs. There are two reasons, however, why this is not the case. First, many 
firms in Denmark have more than one CEO. Second, in Denmark, limited liability firms 
incorporated as ApS corporations can choose whether to have a board of directors and 
many choose this option (38 percent of our sample). 
We also classify shocks by the type of relation between the manager and the 
deceased.  We identify 1,476 shocks to managers themselves, 1,483 to their spouses, 415 
to their children, 5,067 to their parents, and 2,561 to their parents-in-law. In our sample 
  984% of the managers are male, which are more likely to die before their female spouses.
2 
Despite this fact, the number of shocks to managers is roughly the same as the number of 
shocks to spouses. This can be explained by the fact that we construct the sample by 
taking the first shock for each firm. This procedure, in effect, over samples male relative 
to female family members. The small number of child relative to managers’ deaths is due 
to their young age. Age can also be a factor that explains the large number of shocks to 
parents. 
 
III.  Empirical Strategy and Prediction 
 
We use shocks to CEOs, board members and these managers’ family members to 
answer a number of questions related to the role of managers in their organizations. 
First, we test whether managers materially affect their firms’ prospects by 
evaluating the change in performance around their own death. This test measures the 
effect of the loss of the senior manager. If the manager’s absence is not important for her 
firm’s prospects, we should not observe any significant change in performance around 
the event. In contrast, if the manager’s presence is important, we should observe a 
significant change (positive or negative) in firm performance around her death. 
An alternative setting to study the effect of the absence of a manager is to 
evaluate changes in firm performance around resignations and firings. However, a 
problem with this strategy is that resignations and firings might be prompted by changes 
in unobservable firm characteristics whose effect we might erroneously attribute to the 
manager’s absence. For example, a statistically insignificant change in performance 
following a forced management turnover can be view as evidence that the new and old 
CEOs are of comparable ability. However, an alternative explanation is that, expecting 
investment opportunities to deteriorate, the board chose a higher ability manager. The 
effect of better management outweighed the more difficult circumstances the firm faced, 
resulting in virtually unchanged performance. Because the timing of deaths is likely to be 
                                                 
 
2 Even though same-sex marriage is allowed in Denmark since 1989, only a small fraction of the CEOs in 
our sample have a spouse of the same sex. 
  10exogenous relative to observed and unobserved firm characteristics, our empirical 
strategy does not have this problem. 
Second, we analyze whether deaths of managers’ immediate relatives affect 
performance through their effect on the manager. We first evaluate whether deaths of 
managers’ family members have an impact on firm performance. Finding a significant 
change in performance, however, does not necessarily imply that the shock works 
through the manager. An alternative interpretation is that the deceased worked in the firm 
and his death implied the loss of a key employee. Even though we do not have complete 
information on all employees of firms, we can test this alternative hypothesis by 
assessing whether the effect is present for family members that are not of working age. If 
the change in performance is still significant for this group, it would suggest that the 
family member’s death impacts performance indirectly through its effect on the manager. 
Even if we are able to rule out the direct effect of the death of a manger’s family 
member on firm performance in favor of an indirect effect working through the manager, 
we would still not be able to attribute differences in performance changes around the 
event to managerial ability. The reason is that the effect on performance we measure is 
driven by at least two factors: managerial ability and her response to the shock (e.g., in 
terms of reduced effort supplied or fewer hours worked). To illustrate this problem, 
assume that performance, P, is given by the product of managerial ability, a, and effort 
supplied, e, as follows: 
P = a * e. 
The change in performance around a family members’ death is given by: 
 
ΔP = a * es – a * en = a Δe, 
 
where en is the effort supplied under normal circumstances and es is the effort supplied 
following the shock. Under the assumption that the behavioral response to the shock is 
constant for everyone (constant Δe), we could use the measured ΔP to rank managerial 
ability: the higher the magnitude of the performance change, the higher managerial 
ability. 
  11However, if the behavioral response is not a constant across managers differences 
in ΔP across firm will capture variation in abilities and the response to the shock. 
Moreover, the interpretation of ΔP becomes problematic is ability and the behavioral 
response to the shock are correlated. For example, consider the extreme case in which 
high-ability individuals (high a) are also the ones who are not distracted from their 
professional activities even under extreme personal circumstances (Δe=0). In this case the 
magnitude of ΔP for high-ability managers would be zero and that for lower ability 
managers would be strictly positive. 
To investigate cross-sectional variation in ability and the behavioral response to 
the shock, we compare the effect of managers’ own shocks to that of shocks to managers’ 
family members as a function of individual, firm or industry characteristics. This strategy 
is valid if the firms affected by managers’ deaths are comparable to those affected by 
deaths of managers’ family members. 
As an illustration, suppose that we seek to evaluate the effect of managers’ 
education. We first compute the change in performance around managers’ own deaths 
separately for two groups of managers split by their education level. Suppose that we find 
that the change in performance is not affected by manager’s education. Because 
managers’ own deaths are not confounded with a behavioral response, one interpretation 
of this result is that managerial ability is not related to education level. We then compare 
the change in performance for the two groups of managers when the shock is defined as 
deaths of the managers’ family members. Suppose we find that performance drops more 
when relatives of highly educated managers suffer the family shocks. Because results 
from own shocks suggest that ability of these two groups if the same, a larger magnitude 
in the highly educated group would suggest that these managers have a larger behavioral 
response. 
Finally, to gain further understanding of the results, we study the cross-sectional 
distribution of the effect using individual, firm and industry characteristics. For example, 
a significant drop in performance around a managers’ death could be due to the fact that 
the deceased manager was particularly adept at managing the firm. If this were the case, 
we would expect a larger drop in performance in firms in which managerial ability is 
likely to be more important. The same negative drop could be alternatively explained by 
  12a lengthy succession process during which there is a power vacuum. If this were the case, 
we would expect to find a larger drop in performance in firms that had less time to 
prepare for the shock, that is, firms in which the death was sudden and unexpected. 
 
IV.  Results 
 
IV.A. Univariate analysis 
We initially test for the impact of top management own and relatives’ deaths on 
firm performance by computing mean differences in industry adjusted operating 
profitability around these events. These differences are computed using the average 
operating profitability in the year of the death and the year after, and subtracting the 
average profitability of the same firm the two years prior to the death.  
Table II shows that the 11,002 deaths in the sample are associated with an average 
decline in profitability of 0.63 percentage points. The decline is significant at the one-
percent level. When we divide the deaths in the sample into two groups depending on 
whether they occur to CEOs or to board members, we find that it is only those deaths 
associated to the CEO directly or to his or her relatives that matter for firm profitability. 
Deaths occurring in the family or to the CEO are linked to a reduction in OROA of one 
percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. This decline in OROA is 
equivalent to 13 percent decline in profitability in two years. Board member shocks in 
contrast, do not exhibit a significant role on firm profitability. Average profitability falls 
by 0.25 percentage points, yet this decline in OROA is not statistically different from 
zero at conventional levels. The difference in the decline in performance between CEO 
and board member shocks is -0.747. It is, however, not statistically different from zero. 
The differential results for CEO and board members found in Table II could be 
graphically seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots average industry-adjusted OROA relative to 
the year prior to the deaths identified in the sample, which is set to zero. In contrast to 
Table II that only focuses on years t=-2, t=-1, t=0 and t=+1, Figure 1 reports average 
industry adjusted OROA for the years ranging from t=-4 to t=+4, where the data is 
available. Figure 1 shows there is no significant movement in firm profitability before the 
benchmark year. Yet after the shocks occur, firm profitability falls particularly for those 
  13firms that receive a CEO shock. Figure 1, also suggests the estimated effects would be 
larger than the first row in Table II suggests, if we were to open the window of analysis 
to include years t=+2 and t=+3. 
The second row in Table II presents mean declines in performance for the cases of 
direct-manager deaths only. Consistent with the idea that senior management deaths harm 
firm profitability, we find that on average the 1,476 CEO and board members deaths 
identified in the sample are associated to a decline in profitability of 0.744 percentage 
points. Broken by managerial roles, we find that CEO own deaths are correlated with a 
1.44 percentage points decline in profitability, significant at the one-percent level. On the 
other hand, board members’ own deaths are associated to an insignificant 0.22 decline in 
OROA. The difference between CEO and board members deaths is 1.22 percentage 
points, significant at the 10-percent level. These mean differences suggest CEO shocks 
are arguably more important for firms’ prospects than shocks occurring to members of 
the board. 
Table II also presents mean differences in industry adjusted OROA for the case of 
spouse, children, parent and parent-in-law deaths. The effect of family deaths on firm 
profitability resembles the direct manager death effects. Namely, the point estimate of 
CEO shocks on performance is statistically different from zero for every event: spouses 
(one-percent level), children and parents (five-percent level), and parents-in-law (ten-
percent level) deaths. The estimated coefficient ranges from -1.63 for children’ to -0.67 
for parents-in-law. Interestingly, the largest average declines in profitability are found in 
the personal shocks that affect the CEOs own nuclear family, that is, in the deaths of their 
spouses and children. In contrast, no board member shock is, on average, statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels. The resulting CEO-board member differences 
are generally no different from zero, yet they suggest CEO shocks tend to hurt firm 
performance more than shocks occurring to board members.  
One concern with the shocks identified above is that they might only be 
representative of small firms. Our dataset builds on the universe of firms in Denmark, 
where a significant fraction of firms is indeed small. To explore whether size alone could 
explain why we identify a relationship between managerial shocks and firm profitability, 
in Table III we divide the sample firms into five groups according to size (total assets). 
  14Given the results in Table II, in Table III we concentrate on the effect of CEO shocks 
only. For reference, we replicate in the first row of Table III the estimated coefficient for 
CEO events and we also report the estimated effects broken by direct and family events.  
Table III shows CEO shocks affect firms irrespective of which size quintile they 
belong to demonstrating a strong overlap between CEO’s personal and business spheres. 
The largest quintile of firms indicates that CEO shocks lead to a decline in OROA of 0.99 
percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. The estimated effect of CEO 
shocks are -1.079, -1.218, -0.866 and -0.853 for quintiles one through four. All of these 
shocks are significant at the five-percent level except for the shock on the smallest 
quintile, which is significant at the 10-percent level. Interestingly, the difference between 
quintile five and one is small (0.087) and not statistically different from zero. The last 
column in Table III tests for the difference between CEO death effects and those derived 
from the death of family members for each size quintile. We fail to find significant 
differences for direct and indirect shocks.  
Table IV explores whether the direct and indirect shocks described above differ 
systematically as a function of the gender of the manager (Panel A) or the deceased 
(Panel B). As in Table III we only report shocks occurring to CEOs. Columns II and III 
report results for females and males, respectively. The first row in Table IV shows direct 
shocks only. We find that, on average, the 41 female-CEO deaths in the sample lead to a 
decline in operating profitability of 0.43 percentage points. Yet this decline is not 
significant at conventional levels. Male-CEO deaths (588 cases) are found to induce a 
decline in OROA of 1.51 percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. The 
difference across gender is not statistically different from zero. The fact that female 
CEOs are not found to induce a larger decline in firm profitability is not in line with the 
notion that those female CEOs that make it to the top managerial position are superior in 
terms of ability relative to those male CEOs that do not have to suffer discrimination.  
The second row in Table IV shows the average family shock effects for female 
and male CEOs. Firms whose female CEO suffers a death in the family undergo a decline 
in industry adjusted OROA by 2.23 percentage points, a decline of 28 percent relative to 
average profitability. In contrast, firms whose male-CEO suffers a family shock exhibit a 
decline in profitability by 0.80 percentage points (8 percent points). The difference for 
  15female and male family shocks is 1.43 lower for males, significant at the five-percent 
level.  
As discussed in Section III, the larger effect on female-CEO firms could be 
attributed to several firm or CEO characteristics, such as higher ability of female CEOs, 
differential emergency planning, or higher female commitment to family-related 
activities relative to males, among others. If, however, those firms that suffer direct and 
indirect shocks have comparable investment opportunities, organizational designs, family 
participation and CEO talent, the significant gap between female and male CEOs could 
potentially be attributed to a differential gender response to these family shocks. 
Alternatively, these differences could, for example, reflect the fact that female CEO 
shocks differ because a spouse shock also implies the loss of a key employee (the 
spouse). This “double” shock would be arguably less likely to occur in a male-CEO firm 
if female-spouses are less likely to work in the same firms as male-spouses. 
When we analyze family shocks in detail, we find that female-CEO firms exhibit 
the largest effects on profitability in the case of spouses and children (-4.1 and 3.8 
percentage points, significant at the one and ten percent levels, respectively), then parents 
(-2.4, significant at the five-percent level) and the lowest in the case of parents-in-law (an 
insignificant 0.428). The effects in male-CEO firms are less robust statistically: only 
those with over one thousand observations are significant, that is, the shocks for parent 
and parents-in-law, both with estimated effects of close to 0.8 percentage points. 
In Panel B in Table IV, we test for differences in the estimated effects as a 
function of the gender of the deceased. We find large and statistically significant 
differences for spouses and parents-in-law. Specifically, the death of a male spouse is 
found to hurt firm performance by 3 percentage points more relative to the female-spouse 
effect. Similarly, the death of a father-in-law is found to hurt firm profitability by 2.6 
percentage points more than the death of a mother-in-law. Surprisingly, mother-in-law 
deaths are the only family-shock event with a non-negative (although insignificant) 
estimated coefficient. 
One concern with the family-shock results in the preceding tables is that they 
might be explained by the death of a family member that is also employed in the same 
firm. Given that we could not identify who works for each specific firm, we can 
  16alternatively test if those family members that die but that are unlikely to work in the firm 
also induce significant performance shocks. In Table 5 Panel A, we investigate the 
impact of children deaths as a function of their age. Interestingly, industry-adjusted 
OROA in those firms whose CEO’s children die at an age younger than 18 years (65 
observations) falls by 3.2 percentage points, significant at the one-percent level. 
Conversely, the decline in OROA for older than 18 years of age children is one-
percentage points but it is not significantly different from zero. This result shows that it is 
unlikely that family shocks affect firm profitability because they hurt the labor force 
output of a family member that works in the same firm. 
Sorting by the number of children we find the biggest effects on firm profitability 
in cases where the CEO only has one child. Specifically, one-child death shocks correlate 
with a 5 percentage point decline in firm profitability irrespective of the age of the child. 
The difference with respect to three or more children-CEO firms is -4.9, significant at the 
one-percent level. The lack of difference in the one-child cases for those younger than 18 
and those 18 or older again cast doubt on the idea that family shocks are only driven by 
children who participate directly in the firms activities. 
In Table 5, Panel B, we provide an alternative test for the idea that family 
members hurt firm performance through their direct involvement in firms by 
investigating the differential effect of relative who die at an age of 75 years or older. 
Older relatives are presumably less likely to be directly involved in productive activities 
and if they are, it could be argued that the value of their productive output is potentially 
less valuable than the value of younger relatives. We find a significant decline in firm 
profitability of 0.90 in those firms whose CEO’s relatives die at age 75 or older, almost 
identical to the lower 0.92 found for younger relatives. The evidence does not support the 
idea that family shocks are larger for those relatives of active working age. 
Overall, univariate tests highlight four main results. First, CEO deaths affect firm 
profitability and show CEOs are material for firms’ prospects. Second, board member 
deaths do not seem to significantly affect firm performance. Third, the death of CEO 
family members including those who are not of active working age demonstrates a strong 
connection between the personal and business roles top CEOs play. Fourth, there is a 
  17differential family-shock effect in female- relative to male-CEO firms, which is not 
straightforward to disentangle. 
 
 
IV.B. Regression analysis 
 
Death associated shocks and firm profitability, asset and sales growth  
 
We now test for the impact of family and own deaths on firm performance 
controlling for an array of observable firm characteristics. In Table VI we test for the 
impact of these shocks on firm profitability, investment (asset growth) and sales growth 
using as controls firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), firm age, firm time-
invariant characteristics (firm fixed effects) and aggregate time effects. As control group 
we initially use all non-event firms with available data. In all cases, we report clustered 
(firm) robust standard errors in order to adjust for the large number of firm-level 
observations and the potential problem arising from the fact that these observations might 
not be independent from each other (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainaithan (2004)). 
In Table VI Column I, we assess if these shocks affect firm operating profitability 
by comparing firm industry-adjusted OROA before and after the identified deaths using a 
two-year window. Notice that beyond the above-described controls, these specifications 
capture the effects net of average industry-year averages. We find that on average CEO 
and board shocks induce a decline in OROA of 0.32 percentage points, significant at the 
five percent level. The size and age controls suggest larger firms tend to be more 
profitable while older companies are likely to be less profitable than other firms. 
Column II in Table VI shows the impact of death shocks is economically large 
and statistically significant only for those firms where the shock affects the CEO. Board 
shocks do not significantly affect profitability levels. Further, the point estimate of the 
effect of board shocks on OROA is positive, yet indistinguishable statistically from zero. 
In contrast, CEO shocks reduce firm operating profitability by 0.77 percentage points, 
significant at the one-percent level. Column III shows these effects are driven by CEO 
shocks.  
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expand the window of analysis to four years around events (Column IV) or when we 
estimate the difference in OROA using information from the years t=-4, t=-3 and t=+3, 
t=+4 for the event firms. Yet, event in this latter case, we find that own and family 
shocks to CEOs are found to harm performance by 0.63 and 0.54 percentage points, 
respectively. 
In Table VI Column VI we evaluate the impact of CEO-shocks on investment 
decisions measured by the change in total assets. CEO deaths could, for example, 
coincide with significant investments efforts by a new CEO which by construction would 
lead to a temporary reduction in operating profitability. We find that higher investments 
could not explain why OROA falls. On the contrary, asset growth falls significantly after 
these CEO shocks occur. The estimated coefficient indicates shock firms asset growth is 
0.9 percentage points lower in the two year-window around these events. This average 
decline is equivalent to a 20 percent decline in asset growth relative to mean investment 
levels. In other words, own and family shocks reduce operating profitability even when 
the firms affected by the shocks exhibit lower asset accumulation relative to their recent 
past and other firms in the economy. 
Lower profitability on assets and lower asset growth suggest a larger than 
proportional impact of family shocks on cash flow measures. To test this idea 
empirically, we evaluate the impact of CEO shocks on sales growth for those firms in the 
sample with available data around these events. Table VI, Column VII presents the 
findings. Sales growth is 2.2 percentage points lower for event-firms in the post period 
relative to other comparable firms. This decline is significant at the one-percent level. 
Sales growth declines do confirm that CEO shocks hurt cash flow measures more than 
OROA numbers suggest. 
 
Family and direct shocks, gender differences and younger relatives 
 
Table VII Columns I and II, replicates the analysis shown in the initial columns in 
Table VI using industry-adjusted OROA when we focus exclusively on events firms. We 
find that, on average, all CEO and board member shocks do not significantly affect 
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levels. Interestingly, and consistent with previous analyses, Table VII Column II 
demonstrates CEO shocks induce large declines in profitability. The impact of CEO 
shocks on industry-adjusted OROA is -0.80, significant at the one-percent level. The 
impact of board shocks is again insignificant.  
Table VII, Column III tests for differences in own and family shocks as a function 
of who these shocks occur to. We find that CEO shocks both direct and through the 
family significantly affect firm profitability. The average CEO-shock coefficient is -0.79, 
significant at the one-percent. Conversely, the direct manager effect and the CEO-direct 
manager effects are no different from zero at conventional levels. These results indicate 
that the source of the shock seems less important than the channel, namely, the CEO. 
We now test for significant differences in manager effects as a function of the 
gender of the active manager. In Column IV of Table VII, we find shocks occurring to 
female-managers both CEO and board members are associated to a significantly larger 
shock to profitability by -0.64, significant at the 10-percent level. Column V shows the 
female-manager effect is not significant when we split it into CEO-female firms and 
firms with a female board member.  
The last two columns in Table VII evaluate whether family members who are not 
linked to the firm are likely to generate a lower estimated effect on performance. Under 
the hypothesis that family shocks matter for firm performance only because they 
represent the death of a relative who directly contributes to firms’ outcomes, we would 
expect family deaths of relatives who are not expected to participate in the firm to 
generate a lower impact on firm profitability relative to those relatives who are of active 
working age. Alternatively, if family shocks affect firm performance because the CEO is 
less able to perform her or his responsibilities in the presence of a family shock due to a 
reduction in the effective time allocated to productive (non-family) tasks, we should find 
no difference. Column VI shows that shocks arising from the death of children younger 
than 18 years of age do not induce a significantly lower profitability relative to other 
shocks. Interestingly, when we interact the CEO with the young children shock terms 
(Column VII), we find that this term is linked, if anything, to higher –not lower– declines 
  20in OROA. As a result, Columns VI and VII suggest the CEO-family shock effects are 
indirect: they affect firm performance through the CEO. 
 
Unexpected shocks, top management structure and industry characteristics 
 
In Table VIII, Columns I and II we examine whether those deaths that are more 
likely to be classified as unexpected induce larger or smaller effects on firm profitability 
relative to other deaths. In Column I we only report those firms where the deceased was 
found to have died from a condition where the one-year probability of survival 
conditional on an initial diagnosis is less than 25 percent. As before, we find that board 
members-shocks do not significantly affect firm profitability in any sub-sample in Table 
VIII. 
Looking at CEO shocks we find that those deaths that are more likely to be 
unexpected are associated to large declines in operating profitability of 2.1 percentage 
points, significant at the one-percent level. In contrast, the point estimate found in 
Column II, which corresponds to those conditions with larger than 25 percent one-year 
survival probabilities, is -0.7, also significant at the five-percent level. The fact that 
unexpected shocks are more harmful to firm performance could be attributed to the fact 
that expected deaths allow both family and firms to prepare both emotionally and in 
organizational terms for the eventual shock. In the case of the direct CEO shocks, firms 
have more time to prepare for an orderly management transition. Similarly, expected 
family shocks are less likely to reduce the effective productive abilities of CEOs by 
providing time to plan both at the firm and at home for the eventual family shock. 
Columns III and IV in Table VIII seek to directly test for the differential impact 
of CEO shocks under alternative organizational structures. In particular, Denmark 
provides with an interesting laboratory for analysis as the legal environment allows a 
range of small firms to use a dual CEO structure in lieu of a board of directors. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether such organizational structure is 
superior relative to other forms of organization, it is arguably reasonable to assume that 
dual CEO structures are better prepared to overcome a direct-CEO or a CEO-family 
shock relative to unique-CEO hierarchies. In Column III we report the estimated 
  21coefficients for the sub-sample of firms with a single-CEO arrangement. We find a gap in 
industry adjusted OROA of -0.96, significant at the one-percent level. Interestingly, 
Column IV shows that the sub-sample of dual-CEO firms do not undergo statistically 
significant declines in operating profitability after they are subject to a CEO shock. The 
estimated CEO-shock effect is -0.47 but it is not statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels. These results do suggest that organizational planning and structures 
could potentially reduce the impact of CEO shocks on firm performance. 
Table VIII also shows the results when we split the firms in the sample into two 
groups based on the growth patterns of the industries in which the relevant firms operate 
in. We split the industries in half based on total asset growth at the industry level during 
the sample period. Column V (VI) shows the results for those firms in industries with 
relatively slow (high) asset growth. We find that CEO-shocks are found to reduce 
operating OROA in the two sub-samples, leading to a decline in operating profitability of 
0.67 and 0.91 percentage points in the slower and faster growth industries, respectively.   
Finally in Table VIII we test for evidence that chief executive officers tend to be 
more important in relatively high skilled industries. Bennedsen, et al (2007) show the 
value of professional CEOs tends to be higher in those industries where a large fraction 
of the labor force is relatively well educated. Columns VII and VII present the results 
when we divide the firms in the sample into two groups based on the industry-level share 
of employees with a college or superior degree. Consistent with the idea that the firm 
effects derived from CEO-shocks are linked to CEO ability, we show that CEO shocks 
only hurt firm profitability in knowledge intensive industries. In contrast, CEO shocks are 
not statistically different from zero in industries with low labor force schooling levels. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated the impact of individual shocks occurring to 
senior management or to the relatives to senior management on firm performance. We 
have argued that analyzing these shocks is attractive because they provide a plausible 
exogenous source of variation to empirically assess the importance of managers in their 
  22firms, as well as to quantify the interaction between the personal and business roles that 
managers play, and their bearing on firm performance.  
To pursue these tests, we used a unique dataset that allow us to match every firm 
in Denmark to information about the firms’ financials, its management team and to 
official Civil Registry data on its managers. Based on these data we were able to 
construct manager specific family trees and to identify cases of both managers’ deaths 
and deaths of close managers’ relatives, such as spouses, children, parents and parents-in-
law. 
We first used senior management deaths to evaluate whether firm profitability is 
affected when chief executive officers (CEOs) and board members die. We found that 
firms’ prospects are significantly negatively affected by the loss of their CEO, but are 
unaffected by the loss of a member of the board. Our results, as a result, provide 
empirical support to the idea that certain managers, in our sample firms CEOs, are 
extremely important firms’ performance: CEO deaths affect firms operating profitability, 
its investment decisions and sales growth. 
After documenting the direct effect of CEOs on firm performance we also 
investigated the importance of family shocks on firms’ outcomes. We argue the deaths of 
the CEOs immediate family members have a causal impact on firm performance. In 
contrast to own CEO death events that affect firm performance directly, these alternative 
shocks affect firms’ prospects indirectly. CEO’s immediate family deaths and their tragic 
consequences are likely to reduce the CEOs effectiveness in the business front, leading to 
significant declines in profitability. We show these personal and business connections are 
prevalent in both small and large firms. We also show these results are not explained by 
deceased family members who engage in productive activities relevant to the CEO’s 
firm.  
Overall, our paper provides startling evidence that chief executive officers are 
able to significantly affect firm performance. CEO death analysis shows current chief 
executives outperform relative to firms’ outcomes without them. Similarly, the study of 
immediate family-deaths demonstrate that, on average, those firms whose CEO is under 
personal stress are likely to underperform their peers.  
  23Whether these CEO effects are the result of the efficiency value of CEOs, or are 
alternatively the result of pre-shock strategic behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) that 
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Figure 1. Industry-adjusted operating profitability: 







t=-4 t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
CEO Board member
Industry-adjusted at t=-1 is used as a benchmark
Deaths are classified as CEO (board member) deaths whenever they occur to the relevant manager or to 
his/her spouse, children, parents or parents-in-law




Ln assets 8.130 8.045 8.621 0.576 ***
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0148) (0.0158)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Operating return on assets 0.060 0.057 0.077 0.020 ***
(OROA) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Net income to assets 0.034 0.032 0.041 0.009 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Industry adjusted OROA 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0098 0.011 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Ln sales 8.144 7.996 8.861 0.865 ***
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0279) (0.0300)
[33,907] [28,121] [5,796]
Firm Age 11.187 10.197 16.936 6.739 ***
(0.1237) (0.1403) (0.2062) (0.2602)
[74,880] [63,878] [11,002]
Asset growth 0.039 0.037 0.045 0.008 ***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014)
[62,371] [51,386] [10,985]
Sales growth 0.034 0.032 0.041 0.009 ***








Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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Type of Death All
(IV)
All -0.634 *** -1.001 *** -0.254 -0.747
(0.125) (0.182) (0.170) (0.0510)
[11,002] [5,597] [5,405]
Manager -0.744 ** -1.444 *** -0.224 -1.220 *
(0.309) (0.530) (0.367) (0.645)
[1,476] [629] [847]
Spouse -0.872 *** -1.344 *** -0.407 -0.937
(0.322) (0.483) (0.425) (0.644)
[1,483] [736] [747]
Children -0.710 -1.626 ** 0.464 -2.090 *
(0.581) (0.761) (0.893) (1.173)
[415] [233] [182]
Parents -0.626 *** -0.911 *** -0.302 -0.609
(0.188) (0.265) (0.265) (0.375)
[5,067] [2,691] [2,376]
Parents-in-law -0.438 -0.671 * -0.194 -0.477




Chief Executive Board member Difference
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 




All -1.001 *** -1.444 *** -0.945 -0.499
(0.181) (0.530) (0.194) (0.0564)
[5,597] [629] [4,968]
Smallest quintile -1.079 * -2.609 -0.883 -1.726
(0.567) (1.699) (0.601) (1.180)
[1,121] [127] [994]
Quintile 2 -1.218 *** -0.472 -1.290 *** 0.818
(0.426) (1.158) (0.442) (1.163)
[1,119] [98] [1,021]
Quintile 3 -0.866 ** -2.283 * -0.705 * -1.578
(0.364) (1.186) (0.382) (1.124)
[1,119] [114] [1,005]
Quintile 4 -0.853 ** -0.492 -0.901 ** 0.409
(0.334) (0.796) (0.363) (0.873)
[1,119] [132] [987]
Largest quintile -0.992 *** -1.300 * -0.941 *** -0.359
(0.286) (0.684) (0.314) (0.751)
[1,119] [158] [961]
Difference (largest) vs. 0.087 1.309 -0.058 1.367
(smallest) (0.635) (1.830) (0.678) (1.948)
(I) (II) (III)
Type of Death
Chief Executive Family Member Difference
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 




Manager -1.444 *** -0.458 -1.513 *** 1.055
(0.530) (1.771) (0.554) (1.184)
[629] [41] [588]
Family members -0.945 *** -2.226 *** -0.796 *** -1.430 **
(0.194) (0.652) (0.202) (0.682)
[4,968] [518] [4,450]
Spouse -1.344 *** -4.120 *** -0.698 -3.422 ***
(0.483) (1.072) (0.538) (1.198)
[736] [139] [597]
Children -1.626 ** -3.763 * -1.458 -2.305
(0.761) (1.845) (0.808) (1.972)
[233] [17] [216]
Parents -0.911 *** -2.417 ** -0.766 *** -1.651
(0.265) (1.000) (0.273) (1.039)
[2,691] [236] [2,455]
Parents-in-law -0.671 * 0.428 -0.788 ** 1.216
(0.390) (1.146) (0.402) (1.509)
[1,308] [126] [1,182]
Spouse -0.765 -3.788 *** 3.023 **
(0.537) (1.093) (1.216)
[595] [141]
Children -2.271 -1.275 -0.996
(1.536) (0.830) (1.744)
[82] [151]
Parents -0.941 ** -0.891 ** -0.050
(0.377) (0.364) (0.524)
[1,090] [1,601]




Panel B. Gender of Deceased
Type of Death




Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Children deaths onl
TABLE V. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: BY AGE AND 





All children -1.626 ** -3.247 *** -0.999 -2.248
(0.761) (1.386) (0.907) (1.653)
[233] [65] [168]
Number of Children:
One -5.179 *** -5.234 ** -5.148 ** -0.086









< 18 years 18 or older Difference
( I )( I I )( I I I )
Two -1.993 -3.756 * -1.303 -2.453
(1.387) (2.046) (1.757) (2.688
[96] [27] [69]
Three or more -0.300 -1.928 0.250 -2.178
(1.000) (2.495) (1.050) (2.687
[107] [27] [80]
Difference (three or more) 4.879 *** 3.306 5.398 ** -2.092
vs. (one child) (1.731) (3.388) (2.100) (3.956
 B. All relatives excluding children
All
All non-child relatives -0.912 *** -0.922 *** -0.895 *** -0.027
(0.200) (0.252) (0.327) (0.413
[4,735] [2,981] [1,754]
Age of Relative
< 75 years 75 or older Differe
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The number of firms are in squared brackets. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. TABLE VI. CEO SHOCKS AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Shocks -0.3168 ** 0.0692
(0.1345) (0.1779)
CEO shocks -0.7664 *** -0.6937 *** -0.6313 *** -0.5444 ** -0.899 *** -2.224 ***
(0.2633) (0.1974) (0.1826) (0.2631) (0.3707) (0.7642)
Ln assets 2.6501 *** 2.6502 *** 2.6524 *** 2.6496 *** 2.6211 *** 19.194 *** 10.7840 ***
(0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0812) (0.0792) (0.0804) (0.2488) (0.4248)
Firm age -0.3027 *** -0.3026 *** -0.3035 *** -0.3024 *** -0.2997 *** -0.9852 *** -1.1144 ***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0280) (0.0550)
Year controls
Firm fixed-effects





















































(VII) (I) (II) (V) (VI)
Dependent Variables: 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEOs only All All CEOs only
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 




32TABLE VII. MANAGER AND SHOCK CHARACTERISTICS 
 
(III) (IV) (V)
Shocks -0.1991 0.2091 0.1818 0.3549 0.2862 0.1810 0.1625
(0.2168) (0.2483) (0.2626) (0.2636) (0.3098) (0.2850) (0.2874)
CEO shocks -0.7998 *** -0.7948 *** -0.8822 *** -0.7919 *** -0.7947 *** -0.7560 ***
(0.2615) (0.2850) (0.2678) (0.3098) (0.2850) (0.2874)
Manager direct shocks 0.1704 0.1742 0.1413 0.1712 0.1920
(0.4299) (0.4299) (0.4314) (0.4303) (0.4307)
CEO * Manager direct shocks 0.0305 0.0305 0.0194 0.0304 -0.0084
(0.7289) (0.7289) (0.7296) (0.7289) (0.7298)
Female manager -0.6437 * -0.4386
(0.3603) (0.4133)
CEO * Female manager -0.6008
(0.8044)
Shocks children < 18 deaths 0.0530 1.5214
(1.0773) (1.5315)












[t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]
49,012
0.3715 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717 0.3717





Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
11,002 11,002 11,002
All









Dependent Variable: Industry-Adjusted OROA
(VI) (VII)






All regressions include controls for the natural logarithm of assets, and firm age. Results not shown.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
33TABLE VIII. FIRM AND INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
CEO shocks -2.0701 ** -0.6930 ** -0.9635 *** -0.4732 -0.6692 * -0.9115 ** -0.9848 ** -0.5440
(0.8158) (0.3001) (0.2750) (0.5797) (0.3608) (0.3773) (0.4438) (0.4087)
Shocks 0.5294 0.2820 0.3627 -0.2500 0.0524 0.3583 0.4111 0.2536
(0.7141) (0.2833) (0.2750) (0.5793) (0.3322) (0.3672) (0.4041) (0.3938)
Firm fixed-effects








Dependent Variable: Industry-Adjusted OROA
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VIII)
Yes Yes Yes
5,379 35,816 37,785 11,227 24,729 24,139 18,009






1,156 7,674 8,505 2,497 5,506 5,460 4,042
All All All All
Yes Yes Yes
[t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2] [t=-2,t=+2]




One year prob 

















All regressions include controls for the natural logarithm of assets, and firm age. Results not shown.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
34